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Abstract 
In this paper, we proposed a framework to study the systemic risk due to common asset holdings. A bipartite network 
approach consisted of institutions and asset is developed to understand the financial contagion via common asset holdings 
and we also suggest the numerical approach of this model. Then, it will be a powerful tool for marcoprudential  stress 
testing of financial institutions  or regulatory authorities. 
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1. Introduction  
The recent 2007-2009 financial crisis give us a better understanding of systemic risk of financial market due 
to its structure, i.e. the complex interconnection among financial institutions and the financial contagion 
running through them. Financial contagion works through three main channels: 1) the counterparty risk; 2) the 
roll-over risk and 3) the common asset holdings. Since all these channels can be described by network or 
matrix, this paper developed an approach of computing the stability of financial networks under contagion to 
make a better understanding of the effect of common asset holdings. 
The loan relations among institutions cause the problem of counterparty risk and roll-over risk. While an 
institution fails to pay its debts and then resulted in the other institutions failure, the counterparty risk occurs. 
When creditors call off lending due to failure or under pressure, the institutions which rely on the short term 
lending for liquidity no longer borrow and consequently fail or are under pressure, the roll-over risk occurs. 
These two risks gained the most sight though many believe common asset holdings cause them. 
Common asset holdings drive the financial contagion (May and Arinaminpathy, 2010). When the asset price 
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fluctuation lead to an institution bankrupt, the clearance sale of its portfolio further cut down the prices, which 
then cause other institutions failure, and result in a spiral of selling and further prices descending. 
Common asset holdings are general because many institutions and funds which believe in the CAPM and 
portfolio theory intend to diversify their investment for hedge against risk. It occurs even without inter-
institution lending. In consideration of financial institutions investment always leveraged the factor of 30 or 
more, our model set leverage as an important parameter. 
Nier et.al (2007), Gai and Kapadia (2010) has studied the problem of common asset holdings and they 
considered the liquidation effect on the top of counterparty risk and roll-over risk. We are interested in how the 
financial contagion spreads through institutions via their common asset holdings which prices are determined 
by the market impact function.  
In this paper, we proposed a simple model: each institution owns a portfolio, when one of them goes 
bankruptcy due to loss of its portfolio, its portfolio will be liquidated and then the prices of assets in its 
portfolio will be depressed by a market impact function transmitting the sale size into the price adjustment. The 
following is that the price decreases of this portfolio lead to some other institutions fail due to the loss of their 
portfolios which could be overlapped with the fail ones in turn. We focus on whether the contagion continues 
while the system parameters including leverage, average diversification of portfolio, market impact function, 
etc. change under the different exogenous shock. For better description of this process, we introduce the 
concept of the globe cascade failure (Watts, 2002) and give it our own definition. 
This paper is organized as follows: the section 2 describes the model, the section 3 designs a numerical 
approach to understand how the parameters influence the financial contagion. The section 4 introduces the 
conclusion. 
2. The model 
The portfolio theory suggests that institutions should decentralize the investment to eliminate the unique risk 
and gain the minimum variance as far as possible. Furthermore, the CAPM points that all the risk of a fully 
diversified portfolio is market risk. However, some institutions don t following this diversification strategy for 
their capital budget or manager s character in the real market. Then we consider a general financial system in 
terms of a m n  matrix 
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where m represents number of the institutions, n represents the number of the assets and ijw  is the number of 
shares that institution i hold the asset j . If 0ijw , the institution i don t hold the asset j. If 1 2, ,... 0,i i inw w w , 
the institution i hold all the asset in its portfolio. 
We use a 1n  matrix 1 1 2, ,...,
Tt t t t
n nP p p p  to describe the prices of assets at time t. Then the value of all 
institution s portfolio at time t will be 
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Besides their portfolio, the institutions also hold cash and have liabilities which can present as 1m  matrix 
1mC  and 1mL  respectively. Neither of them depend on time. 
The whole equity of the institutions thus is a 1m  matrix at time t 
                                                               1 1 1 1
t t
m m m mE A C L .                                                               (3) 
At time t, the condition of a financial institution bankrupt is  
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Considering that 0i1e
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The left hand side shows the loss with respect to the initial portfolio value. And we can write the above 
equation with leverage as parameter
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It s clearly the bigger the value of 1ig , the easier the condition satisfied.
Whenever an institution match the condition of bankruptcy, its whole portfolio will be liquidated 
immediately and lead to the price decrease of assets included in this institution s portfolio. Suppose the jv is
the fraction of asset j liquidated, the price of j will move to
j j j jp p f v .                                     (7)
For convenience, we transmit the matrix mnW into a bipartite network which is showed in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. Graph of a bipartite financial network
The bipartite network means that there are two sets of nodes (institutions and assets) and the links only exist
between the two sets. We define the number of edges linking institution i as ir which represents the number of 
assets in its portfolio. Similarly,  js represents the number of the edges linking asset j which shows how many
institutions invest on it. In general terms, the average diversification is
1
m1
m
i 1
ir . (8)
Conversely, the average overlapping of assets is
1
jn
2
n
1
js .                                    (9)
Because each link connects an institution to an asset, it s obviously that 1m 2n . Thus we can give two
rough parameters of the financial network, 1 and /m n . The overlapping parameter /m n measures the 
density of institutions choosing their portfolio from the same assets pool.
 By now, the information of the financial network is completed and the focus is how the system response to
an initial shock. We simply consider initial bankruptcy of a random institution as the shock. The dynamics
follow the chain of events due to the initial shock and can be described as figure 2.
Institutions Asset
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Fig.2. The dynamics process 
Assuming that none of new institutions enter the network, the bankrupt institution will remain its state to the 
end.   
3. The numerical approach 
We now design a numerical approach to watch how the stability of financial network depends on the above 
parameters.  
Firstly we define a global cascade of bankruptcy to measure the stability of the system. Since in the 
numerical simulation m and n are both finite, we consider that a global cascade occurs when the number of 
failed institutions exceeds a fixed threshold. 
Secondly, we consider the matrix mnW  assignment with particular distribution like Poisson, Gaussian, and 
uniform. Note that the network has two important parameters 1  and /m n , the edges of institutions and assets 
need to be appointed following a distribution. 
Next the assignments of matrix 01 1 1, ,m m mP C L  are considered following Gaussian distribution or others. Thus 
each institution has different equity and leverage.  
Finally, we assume the market impact function has different forms, from simple linear function to nonlinear 
exponential function, square-root function (Farmer, 2002; Bouchaud et.al, 2009), in coincidence with the actual 
evidence. 
4. The conclusion 
In this paper, we proposed a framework to understand the systemic risk of financial network due to common 
asset holdings.  
Since the stability of a financial network could depend on many factors, we choose four parameters which 
are leverage, average diversification, average overlapping and market impact function to measure it. We expect 
to explore a feasible way for macroprudential stress testing and gain better understanding of the systemic risk 
due to the financial network via a large number of simulations with different configuration. Furthermore, the 
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Reset the prices of assets 
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numerical approach could help forecasting the sudden collapse of financial system and building a robust 
financial network in the overall perspective. 
Our works still need an analytical approach while the system is infinite. And our model could be extended to 
a graph network with links between the nodes of the same type. A further work of us is to improve this paper 
via numerical simulations and calibrate the model with real data. 
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